The Anatomy of Evil Essay Example for Free

The Anatomy of Evil Essay In his Vessels of Evil, Laurence Thomas contends that the insane can do no evil (p. 98). Thomass view about the relationship between evil and insanity is common among laypeople, psychiatrists and philosophers. In this section I consider whether the insane are precluded from evildoing. Part of the problem in assessing the claim that the insane can do no evil, is that it is not always clear to whom we are referring by the term ‘insane’. According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the insane are people who are in a state of mind that precludes normal perception, behavior, and ordinary social interaction; they are mad, psychotic or mentally ill. However, by ‘insane’ Thomas and others who argue that the insane can do no evil cannot mean anyone with a mental illness (i. e. anyone with a disorder listed in the DSM-IV), for there is no reason to hold that e. g. individuals suffering from Obsessive-Compulsive disorder or from spider phobias cannot do evil. More than likely those who argue that the insane can do no evil mean something closer to the legal notion of insanity according to which the insane are those who, â€Å"at the time of act[ing], . [are] laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act [they are] doing; or if [they do] know it, [they do] not know [they are] doing what [is] wrong† (Clark and Fin, p. 210). This is the content of the famous McNaughtan Rules which have come to dominate the common law on the defense of insanity. However, one problem with the legal notion of insanity is that it is not always clear who is able to ascertain the nature and quality of their actions or to tell that what they are doing is wrong. Also, it isnt clear that the legally insane will always be precluded from evildoing. In what follows I consider the relationship between various mental illnesses, legal insanity and our ability to do evil. I argue that the Desire Account of Evil provides a natural demarcation between those mental illnesses that preclude us from evildoing and those that do not. I contend that the legal notion of insanity is a less accurate guide. People suffering from delusions or psychoses are unable to see the world correctly or to draw reasonable inferences from their perceptions (APA, pp. 273-281). They are like the citizen of Usville who cannot be expected to believe anything other than that the Notlikeuses are hostile vampires from another planet. Like the citizen of Usville, delusional or psychotic schizophrenics do not have e-desire sets because they have good reasons for their false beliefs about the worthiness of the goals for which they desire harm or about the significance of the harm they desire. Thus, people who cause others significant harm because of delusions or psychosis resulting from their mental illnesses do not do evil for two reasons: they do not do evil because their actions do not follow from e-desire sets and they do not do evil because they are not moral agents. Besides schizophrenia, other disorders such as Schizoaffective Disorder, Delusional Disorder, Brief Psychotic Disorder, Dementia, Manic depression, etc. can involve psychotic or delusional episodes where a patient may perform actions causing great harm to others because their mental illness causes them to believe that the goal for which they cause the harm is justified or that the harm they cause is insignificant (APA, pp. 273-315). In all of these cases no evil has been performed according to my account of evil. Also, people committing crimes under delusions or psychoses are often deemed legally insane by jurists and judges, for if we commit a crime because of delusions or psychoses we do not know the nature or quality of our actions. For instance, in 1843, Richard Dadd was deemed legally insane and thus acquitted of the brutal murder of his father because he had the delusional belief that his father was the devil. In fact, almost all cases of legal insanity involve mental illnesses that include delusions or psychosis (Cleckley, pp. 514-527). People with dissociative identity disorder have two or more distinct identities or personality states. Usually there is a primary identity which uses the name of the individual who hosts the identities. This identity is typically passive, dependent, guilty and depressed. Alternate identities, on the other hand, typically have personalities that contrast with the primary identity, e. g. they are hostile, controlling, aggressive, and lack remorse. Individuals with dissociative Identity Disorder experience alternate identities taking control in sequence, often denying knowledge of their actions to the other identities including the primary identity (APA, p. 84). It is reasonable for the courts to excuse individuals with dissociative identity disorder for their wrongdoing on the basis of insanity because the primary identities in these cases are often not aware of the nature or quality of the wrongful acts caused by their more aggressive identities, and the court cannot split the guilty identities from the innocent ones for the purpose of punishment. I also think that those who intentionally cause or witness someone elses significant harm from an e-desire set as an alternate identity have not committed evil. For in these cases the primary identity does not intentionally cause or witness someone elses significant or serious harm from an e-desire set, the alternate identity does. Thus, it is the alternate identity who acts evilly and not the primary identity. We must judge each identity and her actions independently. Perhaps the most famous and controversial cluster of mental disorders that can lead to significant harm are the antisocial personalities disorders. According to the DSMIV persons diagnosed with antisocial personalities must be at least 18 years old; display a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others since age 15; have displayed evidence of conduct disorder since before age 15; and have at least three of the following seven traits: (1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest, (2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, uses of aliases or conning others for personal profit or pleasure, (3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead, (4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults, (5) reckless disregard for the safety of self or others, (6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior or honor financial obligations, and (7) lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another (Ibid, pp. 646-650). Cleckley argues that psychopaths are not responsible for their actions because they often act against their own self-interest and are therefore irrationa1. For instance, psychopaths often appear to be hopelessly impulsive, and committing crimes they are sure to be incarcerated for just hours after they are released from wards they claim to detest. However, others, such as Vinit Haksar, argue that we can only judge the psychopaths seemingly irrational impulsivity as counter to his self-interest if we assume he has values roughly the same as ours. But, Haksar claims, we should not make this assumption since psychopaths may simply value committing spontaneous antisocial acts very highly, and value things that the rest of us value highly (e. g. relationships, careers, freedom) relatively low or only as a means to carry out antisocial activities. Generally, psychopaths are thought to be criminally responsible for their actions and are tried for their crimes since they do not suffer from delusions or psychoses of any kind and they reason well enough. When psychopaths commit crimes they know they are breaking societal norms and thus they seem to pass the McNaughtan test for legal sanity. However, some, such as Antony Duff, have argued that psychopaths are so emotionally and morally deficient that they cannot understand the emotional and moral significance of matters such as death, love, friendship and career for others, and so, they cannot understand how they provide reasons for acting and for judgment (Duff, p. 193). Thus, psychopaths do not truly understand the nature and quality of their actions since they lack the basic values and emotional capacity required for understanding morality. Duff concludes that psychopaths should be considered legally insane and not criminally responsible. Besides discussing the relationship between various mental illnesses and evildoing, I have also argued that we cannot equate those whose mental illnesses preclude them from evildoing with the legally insane. One reason we cannot equate these two groups is that it is sufficient for legal insanity that we are unable to know whether our actions are wrong, while this condition is irrelevant to whether our act is evil Another reason we may not be able to equate those whose mental illnesses preclude them from evildoing with the legally insane is that we may be required to have a greater understanding of the nature of our actions to be criminally responsible than we do to be evil That is, if Duff is right that psychopaths are so emotionally deficient that they cannot sufficiently understand the nature and quality of their actions for legal sanity, then we need a better understanding of the nature and quality of our actions to be criminally responsible than we do to be capable of evil I do not argue one way or the other about whether Duff is correct in his insistence that legal sanity requires an emotional understanding of the nature of our actions. Instead, I argue that, regardless of the condi tions required for legal sanity, for evil we must only have the perceptual, cognitive and deliberative capacities required for moral agency and for recognizing that we intentionally cause or witness someone elses significant or serious harm.